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There is already considerable talk about the possible need for a massive public works program in
response to the deepening recession and rising unemployment. However, an ad hoc emergency
approach is going to waste billions of dollars by mismatching skills and needs. The proposal out-
lined here is aimed directly at providing good planning consistent with maintaining market free-
dom and minimizing pork-barrel legislation.
In spite of the glamour of high finance, investment banking, and the stock market, efficient
production and full employment are what count. A healthy economy is one that does not waste
the real resources of goods and labor. 
Enterprise is fostered by commonly understood and accepted rules of the game, and the rules
do not appear by magic, nor do the markets produce them. They require the development and
enforcement of, among other things, an accounting system, bankruptcy and default laws, a com-
mercial code, and contract law. When the system is under stress, fail-safe measures must be
adopted.
In the reality of a dynamic economy, the formulation, legislation, and enforcement of rules
to set the stage for the functioning of a successful enterprise economy are critical. It is a difficult,
ongoing process overseen by fallible and self-centered human beings.
Ideologues on both the right and the left imagine utopian scenarios that include either an
ideal government or no government at all. Neither of these states has, or ever will, exist, except in
political rhetoric aimed at fooling the unwary. Reality and “good enough” economic efficiency
reside not only in building the institutions and laws that provide the rules of the game but also in
answering the question, Can these rules be implemented successfully at a reasonable cost? One of the more successful government financial institu-
tions in the United States is the Federal Reserve System (Fed). 
It has manifested an interesting blend of public and private
forces, and is clearly sensitive to both local and global concerns.  
Unfor  tunately, the Fed and the Treasury are not enough. There
are occasions when the financial control mechanisms of a soci-
ety are not sufficient to prevent serious damage to the funda-
mental economy they are meant to protect. Therefore, the system
requires a fail-safe mechanism that comes into play when the
financial brakes do not work. Such a mechanism, in the form of
a Federal Employment Reserve Authority, is discussed below.
A Financial Fail-Safe Mechanism
Our financial institutions and instruments are part of a delicate
overall guidance and control system for the political economy.
The structure has to match the supply of public goods and tax-
ation to the demands of the electorate. This calls for a blend of
economic, political, bureaucratic, and social forces.
The Federal Reserve System, created by act of Congress in
1913, has been evolving and adjusting for nearly a century. The
system’s organizational structure is laden with checks and bal-
ances, and represents diverse interests. Its Board of Governors is
appointed by the president and requires confirmation by the
Senate. Like the Supreme Court, the Federal Reserve Board is the
product of the interplay of political, economic, and legal forces.
The number of governors reflects a designer judgment call on the
balancing of powers and the ability of the institution to function.
It is suggested that, in order to keep a socially acceptable
index of unemployment below some specified level, a govern-
ment agency similar in power and structure to the Fed would 
be appropriate. This agency—a Federal Employment Reserve
Authority, or FERA—would be devoted to monitoring the 
“natural rate of unemployment,” which is “natural” in the sense
that it is dependent on society’s existing institutions, laws, cus-
toms, and technology. FERA would require considerable   hand-
tailoring to provide the appropriate control details needed. But
as a permanent body it would be a vast improvement over a
last-minute, temporary disaster-relief program such as the
Depression-era Works Progress Administration (WPA).
In the design of an institution aimed at modifying the level
of unemployment it is highly probable that we would need to
hand-tailor a control structure with governance numbers dif-
ferent from those of either the Supreme Court or the Federal
Reserve in order to fit the population of the United States in the
21st century. A sketch of this proposed institution is provided
below.
In addition to its governing board, the Federal Reserve
System includes 12 district banks and has approximately 25,000
employees. An agency such as FERA more naturally calls for 
a central or controlling authority in Washington and a branch
in each of the 50 states. Each state branch would have on aver-
age 100 to 200 employees—for an agencywide total of 5,000 to
10,000—and a board of governors split among business and
labor representatives, as well as academics and federal and state
representatives. Each branch would monitor unem  ployment in
its state. It would also maintain a list of potential public works
projects with priorities and potential revenue-generation possi-
bilities. The priority would be self-liquidating projects where
some portion of the revenues would flow back to either the
state or the federal government.
The central Authority would be responsible for developing
state and federal taxation and funding guidelines in concert
with the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury via a Joint
Assessment Financing Board (JAFB). The duties of this board
would be to constantly monitor the listing, evaluation, financ-
ing, and paybacks proposed by each state branch so that the
structure of the financing could be set in place as soon as the
employment level in any region exceeded the trigger value. A
further duty of the JAFB would be to determine the breakdown
of unemployment in the state—how much is attributable to
recession, and how much is attributable to the application of
new technology. (Technological unemployment should not call
for agency action except via an Educational Retraining Board
acting in concert with the educational resources of the state and
the federal Department of Education.)
It is important to stress that constant monitoring, along
with the ability to act quickly and deliberately, is a necessity.
This will require that legislation be passed in advance to pro-
vide flexibility in emergency financing without having to
request funding from Congress during a crisis.
The central Authority would supervise oversight of the
projects to be enacted. The state branches and member firms
would be responsible for the generation and maintenance of
micro information on local unemployment, the valuation of
projects worthy of sponsorship in a high-unemployment envi-
ronment, and the distinction between recession and technolog-
ical unemployment in their area. 
There are several basic principles that should be adhered to
by the Authority:
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(1) It should never own assets that it does not have the in-
house capability to evaluate, and should avoid supervision of
projects where it does not have in-house expertise.
(2) Its role is to coordinate and stimulate activities promot-
ing employment, not to employ individuals directly. Only under
conditions of a deep depression should a direct, WPA–style
employment approach be permitted as an act of last resort.
(3) The Authority must stress transparency in the availabil-
ity of its information sources, evaluation of the regional eco-
nomic and employment status, as well as the projects to be
implemented and the bidding and procurement procedures
employed.
(4) Once unemployment goes above a fixed level of, say, 
6 or 7 percent (to be adjusted as circumstances warrant), the
Authority would put out bids for projects in coordination with
federal and state funding authorities involved in financing. 
The drafting of institutional rules is an evolutionary
process, and there are many details to be worked out. Rather
than a blueprint, the above comments are offered as a platform
for building in a fail-safe mechanism to protect the real econ-
omy when the financial-control structure fails.
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